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The Military Option in the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
The past months have seen a steady escalation of the
Iranian nuclear crisis. As Iran makes progress in
developing nuclear technology, which they constant-
ly claim will be used solely for civil purposes, Israel’s
diplomatic saber-rattling gets increasingly louder. In
the Western world, open discussion regarding the
advantages and disadvantages of a pre-emptive 
strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities has reached an
unprecedented level of intensity. Differences of opin-
ion and disagreement in expert assessments within
Israel, the United States, and Europe are climbing to
pre-Iraq War levels. Depending on the contributor to
the heated discussion, the result of an Israeli, US, or
combined US-Israeli bombardment of Iran’s nuclear
program would be somewhere between increased
regional security and a whole-scale regional war.
Best Case Scenario for an Israeli Military
Strike
Before the inauguration of a potential Republican
administration in January 2013, a US participation in
a pre-emptive attack against
Iran is unlikely. Hence, the state
to conduct air strikes against
Iranian nuclear facilities in the
upcoming months would likely
be Israel.
To begin with, such a pre-emptive attack would con-
stitute a breach of international law. Art 51 UN
Charta guarantees every sovereign state the “inhe-
rent right of individual or collective self-defense”
irrespective of an authorization of the use of force by
the UN Security Council. According to general legal
conviction, self-defense does not necessarily have to
be reactive in nature, it can also be preventive. This,
however, requires the existence of a specific, objec-
tively imminent attack. The existence of an abstract
threat is clearly insufficient. Over the past years, Iran
has repeatedly uttered abstract threats against
Israel’s security. However, even an imminent Iranian
crossing of the nuclear weapon threshold would not
automatically modify the abstract threat into a speci-
fic one. Hence, without a substantive alteration of
these conditions, there would be no situation of self-
defense; an Israeli air strike would be pre-emptive in
nature and constitute a breach of international law.
In a strategic best case scenario, Israel would succeed
in destroying all relevant Iranian nuclear facilities
without casualties in their own ranks. The Iranian
nuclear program would be thrown back several
years. However, the know-how would survive and
build the foundation for a renewed nuclear program.
This program would likely be implemented with
even more ambition and popular support than the
current one. Iran would then almost certainly strive
for a nuclear weapon capability – currently consti-
tuting only a likely but not the definitive goal of the
regime. Hence, in several years
– experts predict a setback of
five years or less – Iran would
regain its current level of nuc-
lear development. Therefore, an
air strike would merely postpone a problem rather
than solve it. Moreover, an Israeli attack on Iran
would very likely radicalize Iranian foreign policy
and make a renewed Iranian nuclear program even
more dangerous.
An attack on Iran would increase the current Iranian
regime’s stability while suffocating any opposition
tendencies. Historical evidence shows that in almost
all cases foreign military aggression provokes a so
called “rally-around-the-flag” effect, benefitting even
"A pre-emptive air strike against Iran
would be in breach of international
law."
The Iranian nuclear crisis has reached a new peak. An Israeli air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is more likely than
ever. However, such a pre-emptive attack would not only be in breach of international law it would also fail to serve
Israel’s interests. On the contrary, a military attack would put Israel’s security in jeopardy both in the short and
long run and could provoke a regional war as well as an oil crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Therefore, the EU
and its member states should persuade Israel to refrain from a pre-emptive strike against Iran. In contrast, Europe
should advocate firmly a peaceful conflict resolution grounded on incentive-based negotiations with Tehran.
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regimes with disputed popular legitimacy. Thus, the
Iranian regime would be able to instrumentalize the
attack to stabilize its rule.
Lastly, Iran would retaliate in one way or another. At
the very least the Iranian regime would increase its
support for anti-Israeli actors such as Hezbollah and
encourage them to attack Israel.
In this scenario the Iranian regime would benefit
from an Israeli attack while Israel would be subject to
intensified attacks by non-state actors and see its
security jeopardized by a renewed Iranian nuclear
program a few years down the road. This in turn
might make necessary what has
already been suggested in
Israeli academic circles, namely
an Israeli attack on Iranian
nuclear facilities every few
years.
Further Potential Repercussions
The described scenario is not only politically and
strategically undesirable – particularly from an
Israeli perspective – it is also highly unlikely. In the
following, I will introduce additional expectable con-
sequences of an Israeli air strike against Iran.
First, Israel’s air strike could fail to destroy the
Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Unlike the Iraqi
Osirak reactor and the Syrian nuclear facility Israel
destroyed in 1981 and 2007 respectively, the Iranian
targets are heavily fortified and spread over a geo-
graphically large area. According to military experts,
the simultaneous destruction of all targets would
require more than 100 fighter jets and several tanker
planes to refuel the jets on their return trip. It is
doubtful that Israel has sufficient air refueling capa-
city for such a military operation. Moreover, it is
uncertain whether Israel’s GBU-28 bunker buster
bombs will completely destroy the facilities at
Natanz and Fordo, two of four targets Israel would
likely attack. In the case of a failed air strike, the
Israeli military’s myth of superiority and invincibili-
ty would suffer yet another painful blow after its fai-
lure to defeat Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon
War. The Iranian regime would certainly exploit
Israel’s failure for propaganda purposes and present
itself as victorious against the Israeli armed forces.
Second, an Israeli air strike against Iran would con-
stitute an attack on a Muslim country and evoke sym-
pathy for the Iranian regime among non-Iranian
Muslims, predominantly members of the Shia deno-
mination. For years Iran has resorted to blatant anti-
Israeli rhetoric and instrumentalized the plight of the
Palestinians in an attempt to bolster its reputation
and influence among the populations of Arab states.
In the case of an Israeli attack, parts of the Arab Street
would sympathize with Iran and expect their respec-
tive governments to retaliate at least diplomatically
against Israel and its benevolent supporter, the
United States. Among those sympathizing with Iran
would be Shia citizens in the Arab Gulf monarchies.
The latter’s silent endorsement of the Israeli strike
would add additional fuel to the ongoing conflict be-
tween discriminated Shia seg-
ments of the population and
Sunni regimes particularly in
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The
fact that Saudi Arabia’s Shia
minority lives predominantly in the oil rich Eastern
province where it makes up roughly 50% of the
population adds a significant economic aspect to the
equation. Any escalating conflict would take place on
top of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil resources.
Third, Iran would very likely retaliate against an
Israeli attack on a much larger scale than by merely
increasing financial, logistical, and arms support of
Hezbollah, Hamas, and other anti-Israeli non-state
actors. Tehran could additionally retaliate in the fol-
lowing ways:
a) by attacking Israel directly with ballistic missiles:
the Iranian Shahab-3 (type “Meteor”) medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) has a range of 1,300 km and
could therefore reach Israel. However, the reliability
of the missile is questionable. The operational status
of the Shahab-3 (type “Variant”) MRBM with a range
of up to 2,400 km is unclear;
b) by interrupting its oil exports in order to provoke
a rise in the world oil price. The remaining oil pro-
ducers would very likely be unable to compensate
the loss of Iran’s share. Hence, in conjunction with
psychological dynamics influencing the oil market,
the oil price would likely rise. However, Iran would
not be able to uphold such a policy for an extended
period since it depends on the revenues from oil
exports;
c) by targeting oil installations on the Arabian side of
the Gulf, attacking tanker ships in the Gulf water-
ways, and attempting to block the Strait of Hormuz.
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"An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities
would not serve Israel’s interests."
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By doing so, Iran would provoke skyrocketing oil
prices. A partial breakdown of oil production in the
Arab Gulf states and/or an impairment of water-
bound export routes would have a devastating effect
on the world economy and very likely drag other 
states, predominantly the United States, into a mili-
tary conflict with Iran;
d) by attacking US military installations in the Gulf
and thereby forcing the United States to retaliate.
Conclusion and Recommendation
Not only would an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear
program not serve Israel’s security interests, it would
also have disastrous side effects. For the benefit of
merely postponing the abstract threat posed by an
Iranian nuclear weapons capa-
bility, Israel would break inter-
national law, risk a humiliating
military defeat, provoke both
asymmetrical and symmetrical attacks on its territo-
ry, help the Iranian regime stabilize its power,
prompt a radicalization of Iranian foreign policy, and
accept the risk of both an oil crisis of unprecedented
magnitude and the outbreak of a regional war.
Hence, the EU and its member states should engage
Israel in a critical dialogue about the potential repercus-
sions of a pre-emptive strike against Iran and emphati-
cally advocate a peaceful conflict resolution. The EU
should use all diplomatic channels to clarify to Israel that
any further conflict escalation would jeopardize both
Israel’s and the EU’s vital interests in national and region-
al security, respectively, as well as economic stability.
With regard to Iran, constant
threats of force and escalating
economic sanctions have pro-
ven to be counterproductive as
they further motivated Tehran
to forward its nuclear program.
In contrast incentive-based
negotiations are more likely to
be effective. The EU, having
less strained relations with Iran
than the United States as well
as a positive track record in
peaceful conflict resolution,
should take the leading role in
promoting a policy of détente
in the relations between the
West and Iran.
It is essential that the West understands and responds
to the Iranian regime’s motivation behind its nuclear
program. Tehran predominantly aims for prestige
and international recognition as a regional power,
regime security through deterrence, and energy
diversification. It is imperative that the United States
and the Europeans recognize and confront Iran as an
equal partner in international relations and refrain
from branding the regime as illegitimate; the latter
approach, widely considered as imperialistic medd-
ling in Iranian affairs, harms rather than supports
democratic reforms anyway. Moreover, any threats of
regime change should be seized immediately. In this
context, the EU should publicly emphasize Iran’s
natural right to sovereignty and territorial integrity
and not condone or support any military action in
violation of international law. In addition, the EU
should actively advocate a mul-
tilateral non-aggression agree-
ment between Iran, the United
States, and the Arab Gulf states.
At the same time the EU should support an official
US declaration whereby any Iranian pre-emptive
attack on either Israel or the Arab Gulf monarchies
would be considered a situation of collective self-
defense.
Lastly, in return for increased transparency of its
nuclear program the EU and its member states
should offer Iran substantive trade agreements as
well as support in its attempt to diversify its energy
sector. In this context the EU should reconsider past
proposals to provide Iran with nuclear fuel rods for
energy production and offer technical support and
cooperation in the field of renewable energy.
The Iranian regime has repeated-
ly shown its readiness to compro-
mise. It is not too late to take
Tehran up on its offer.
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"The West should enter into incen-
tive-based negotiations with Iran."
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